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T C L S
The Coase Lecture Series, established in honor of Ronald H.
Coase, Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Economics at
the University of Chicago Law School, is intended to provide
law students and others with an introduction to important
techniques and results in law and economics. The lectures presuppose no background in the subject.

I P   A 
S  B
Kenneth W. Dam‡
The basic economic foundations of intellectual property are
straightforward and increasingly recognized by the courts. The
problems lie in applying those principles in particular situations.
That theme can be highlighted by considering how intellectual
property deals with new technologies. This essay will emphasize the
two latest technologies to create major intellectual property problems
for courts and legislatures—namely, software and biotechnology.
New technologies drive courts and legislatures back to basic
principles. For example, new technologies frequently raise the question whether intellectual property rights should be accorded.
The way in which this question arises has traditionally been
somewhat different in copyright from patent, largely for historical
rather than analytical reasons. In the case of copyright the issue has
usually been decided by the Congress, technology by technology.
But even after Congress decides for copyright protection, the scope
of that protection can be enlarged or cut back sharply by the way the
courts apply traditional copyright doctrines. By finding, for example,
that the “writing” in question is an idea1 or a method of operation2
or that copying constitutes fair use,3 courts have it within their
power to restrict drastically the scope of the property right.
In the case of patents in contrast, the Congress has played little
role in the decision whether or not to protect the new technology.
‡ Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of
Chicago Law School. This article is based on a Coase Lecture delivered at the
University of Chicago Law School on May , . This lecture series honors
Ronald H. Coase, Senior Lecturer and Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus
at the Law School and  Nobel Laureate in economics, and is intended to
explore how basic principles of economics can be applied to various fields of
law. The author would like to thank Douglas Baird, Jack Brown, Mark
Ramseyer, and Sandra Panem for their helpful comments.

Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, Inc.,  F.d  (d Cir. ).
2 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc.,  F.d  ().
3 Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,  F.d  (th Cir. ).
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Courts have normally made that determination. But here too the
courts have the power to narrow patent protection by applying
technical patent doctrines so as to leave the property right for a new
technology more theoretical than real.4
Even where the societal consensus is that a new technology
should be accorded legal protection, the question often arises
whether protection should take the form not of traditional intellectual property—say copyright or patent—but rather some new sui
generis form.
Sometimes, even after the decision has been reached to use a
traditional form of protection, strong and persistent voices will be
heard arguing for sui generis protection. For example, a recent massive “Manifesto” in the Columbia Law Review argued for abandoning both software and patent protection of computer software in favor of a new, specially tailored statutory scheme.5
This essay discusses the economic principles of intellectual
property not just in the abstract but especially as they apply to the
decision framework for new technologies. It is limited to patents
and copyrights, leaving out of account trademarks, trade secrets and
other forms of protection (where other considerations come into
play).
I. T E F  I P
What are the basic economic principles underlying intellectual
property protection?
The first derives from the simple observation that innovation
takes the form of information. To be sure, for innovators to profit
from innovation and for consumers to benefit, it is often necessary
for the innovation to be found in some physical form, if only as the
4 The Congress has, of course, the power to legislate to change any judicial decision narrowing, or for that matter broadening, the scope of protection.
For example, a  amendment to the Patent Code cut back substantially on
prior judicial decisions rendering patents unenforceable for patent misuse. See
 Stat. , incorporated in  U.S.C. §(d)() and (). This kind of
Congressional response is relatively rare in intellectual property scope-of-protection decisions.
5 Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor and J.H.
Richman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs,  Colum. L. Rev.  ().

I P



medium in which the innovation is transmitted. Still, the need for
protection arises from the simple fact that the innovation itself is
information and therefore creates a condition often called the public
goods problem. Information is costly to produce, yet cheap to copy.
Indeed, it is often said that my use of information does not exclude
or place any costs on your use of the same information: hence, the
notion of public goods.
Looked at from the standpoint of the innovator, we often describe the same phenomenon as the appropriability problem. If the
information can be copied at little or no cost, then the price for using the innovation is likely to be driven down through competition
to the costs of copying. As a result, the innovator will not be able to
appropriate the benefits of the innovation and recoup his costs of
generating the information in the first place.6 And if this condition
were generalized to innovation as an economy-wide process, then
there would be a less than optimal economic incentive to innovate.
We can, of course, imagine other motives than direct profit—prestige, other nonmonetary returns, monetary returns from being first
to market, and the like—but still the need to protect innovators
through according intellectual property rights is generally accepted
and widely understood.
This incentive-to-innovate principle is quite general. It applies
not only to inventions in the patent sense but also to a wide range of
human activities including the writing and publishing of books, the
traditional realm of copyright. Moreover, even businessmen and
judges who have never heard of public goods or of the appropriation
problem recognize the need to accord intellectual property protection to support research and development and to support investments necessary to commercialization of new technology.
So too, everyone—economist, lawyer, businessman—understands that intellectual property rights can be on balance harmful if
they are too broad in scope or too rigidly applied. Here we come to a
second well-recognized economic principle underlying intellectual
property. Even conceding the need to accord intellectual property
6 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law,  J. Legal Stud. ,  ().
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protection in order to give an incentive, innovation is not a oncefor-all matter. We are interested in innovation over time.7
If giving too broad protection today arrests future innovation,
then we will not have an optimum rate of innovation over time, and
the economy will suffer. This is particularly the case because in the
overwhelming majority of instances each innovation builds on past
innovations. Each innovator stands on the shoulders of the innovators of the past, even where those past innovators were not giants
but just a wee bit taller than the crowd. Hence, to obtain an appropriate balance between innovation today and innovation tomorrow, it is essential to allow access.
How much access, under what conditions, and when are major
topics in the law of patents and copyrights, whatever the legal rubric
used—whether it be, in the case of patents, disclosure, length of
term, or the reverse doctrine of equivalents, or, in the case of copyrights, such doctrines as fair use.8 Sometimes this access principle is
so strongly valued by a society, especially in the case of new technologies, that it is allowed to overwhelm completely the incentiveto-innovate principle and no intellectual property right is accorded.
In the case of patents, this judgment favoring access over incentives
is expressed in the legal conclusion that the invention is nonpatentable subject matter.
II. P N T
In considering the new technologies of software and biotechnology, it is useful to keep in mind that there are in principle three
options for each new technology. First, do not protect at all.
Second, protect in principle while applying the rules in such a way as
to balance incentive and access. A variant of this second option is to
7 See Douglas G. Baird, Changing Technology and Unchanging
Doctrine: Sony Corporation v. Universal Studios, Inc.,  Sup. Ct. Rev.
,  ().
8 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 
J. Legal Stud. , - (). A third economic principle of intellectual
property not specially relevant to new technologies is the need to reduce the
incidence of rent seeking. Patent law, for example, needs to be constructed i n
such a way that it does not lead to undue investment in innovation in the race
to obtain the governmentally-accorded privilege of excluding competitors. Id. at
-, -.
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protect in principle but, because of some societal judgment, to decide—often case by case—to emphasize access over incentive in particular situations.9 Third, protect not through patent or copyright
but through a tailored, sui generis system.
A related preliminary point is that new technology protection
has evolved in somewhat different ways in the copyright and patent
regimes. For the first century of the Republic, and even to some extent today, Congress has made a separate decision as to whether
each new technology should be protected and, if so, how. This pattern was set in the very first copyright statute. In  Congress accorded copyright protection to any “map, chart, book or books”10
and to no other category of writings. In  it added prints, clearly
extending copyright into the realm of technology, albeit not a new
technology.11 In  Congress added musical compositions12 and in
 dramatic compositions.13 In  it added a new technology—photographs.14
Congress did not get around to covering paintings, drawings,
sculpture and fine arts models and designs until .15 When one
considers that Congress covered maps and charts in  and added
photography as soon as the Civil War revealed the power of that
technology, while not even dealing with the fine arts until , we
can deduce that Congress had technology very much in mind in the
first century of American copyright.16
9 A variant of this second option is to emphasize incentive over access.
Although in the application of the second option, the balancing of incentive
and access may have been done by some courts in such a way as to unduly emphasize incentive, no system appears to have explicitly downgraded the access
principle.
10  Stat.  ().
11  Stat.  (). It is significant that in referring to prints, section  of
the  Act speaks of persons “who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or
work” prints. (Emphasis supplied) See William F. Patry, Copyright Law and
Practice, Vol. I, p.  n.  () (hereafter “Patry”).
12  Stat.  ().
13  Stat.  ().
14  Stat.  ().
15 Section ,  Stat. ,  ().
16 See the correlative point that Congress in the first century of American
copyright was at least as concerned with protection of labor-intensive informational writings as with creative writings. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and
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In the twentieth century Congress began to legislate more
generically, presumably leaving to the courts a greater role in deciding to what extent new technologies were to be protected by copyright. For example, the  comprehensive revision uses the format
of protecting “works of authorship” (in the  copyright revision
called “writings of an author”17) which “include” certain stated categories. Examples are literary works and musical works.18 Some of
these categories are defined, other not. Thus, in principle a new
technology could come into existence and be covered under one of
the already listed categories.
But old habits die hard and when it came time to protect some
new technologies, they were legislatively added to the list. Motion
pictures were included in .19 Sound recordings, as opposed to
long-protected musical compositions,20 did not receive explicit protection until .21 When computer software came on the scene,
Congress established a commission to study the problem, but even
before the commission reported, Congress confirmed through legislative history that software would be covered under the existing
category of “literary works,” thereby resolving an already longstanding controversy on the protection issue.22 Later legislation
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information,  Colum.
L. Rev. , - ().
17 Section ,  Stat. ,  ().
18  U.S.C. §.
19  Stat.  ().
20 Patry, Vol. I, -.
21  Stat. . Sound recordings received state law protection earlier, and
there was controversy and ambiguity about pre- federal protection for sound
recordings. Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law §C[][c]. See Goldstein v. California,  U.S. 
(). See Patry, Vol. I, -, - and Vol. II, - (), concerning
the history of protection of sound recordings as well as their indirect protection as derivative works.
22 See discussion in Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations
in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software,  J. Legal Stud. ,  n .
 (hereafter Dam, Legal Protection of Software); and Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New since CONTU?,  Harv. L. Rev. ,
- ().
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nailed down copyright protection for software.23 Indeed, the copyright tradition required special legislation in  simply to include
“architectural works,” even though such works have been around
much longer than any U.S. copyright statute.24
Since the  Act the copyright statute has grown increasingly
complex. Congress has attempted to deal with competitive fights
between industries based on different technologies by adjusting
rights and obligations. The names of some of the statutes tell the
story: the Satellite Home Viewer Act,25 the Audio Home
Recording Act,26 and the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act.27 Without too much exaggeration, one could
summarize the copyright approach as a separate statutory scheme for
each new technology.
Congress has played other roles in deciding on protection. For
example, when the question of protection for semiconductor mask
works arose, Congress decided that, rather than establishing a new
copyright category, a brand new property rights scheme—a sui
generis scheme—should be used. We find it in the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of .28
The pattern in patent law was completely different. The first
patent statute set out to give protection to inventions of every kind.
The original  statute broadly authorized patents on “any useful
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device.”29 Thanks to the
draftsman Thomas Jefferson, something of an inventor himself, a
 amendment broadened the categories to “art, machine, manu Stat.  ().
 Stat. ,  (), now  U.S.C. §(a)(). For the background
of this enactment, see Patry, Vol. I, -.
25  Stat.  ().
26  Stat.  ().
27  Stat.  (). New technologies have led to a large volume of
statutory enactments to define narrow technology-specific rules with regard, for
example, to limitations on rights. See examples in Patry, Vol. , pp. -. For
an extensive explanation of this copyright phenomenon, see Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change,  Oregon L. Rev. 
().
28  Stat. , now  U.S.C. §§-.
29  Stat. ,  ().
23
24
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facturer or composition of matter.”30 Today, the list of categories
remains the same, substituting only “process” for “art” to reflect
contemporary usage.31
To be sure, the form of the patent code is somewhat analogous
to that of the copyright act in the sense that both list categories that
are to be covered. In principle, an invention has to fall within one of
the four patent categories or no patent will issue. However, the four
patent categories are broader and more general than the eight copyright categories. For example, “machine” in the patent statute is an
altogether broader concept than “sound recording” or “architectural
works” in the copyright act. Hence, though the four patent categories could be thought to fail to exhaust the universe of things that
ought to be patented, that view does not reflect that the history of
patent law. Under the patent law in action, new technologies were
automatically covered as they came along. There was no need for
Congressional action.32
Perhaps the different pattern in patent from copyright is not a
question so much of statutory drafting or of inherent differences in
the two types of protection but rather of the very idea of invention,
which presupposes technological change.33 In any event, the patent
law approach focuses attention not on the kind of technology, but
rather on whether the particular invention is new, useful and, to use
the neologism of the current statute, “non-obvious.”34
30  Stat. ,  (). See Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  U.S. ,  (); Graham v. John Deere Co.,  U.S. , - ().
31  U.S.C. §.
32 A fuller discussion of the four patent categories would consider the
definition of “process” in  U.S.C. §(b), which includes in that term “a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.”
33 Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  U.S. ,  (); and see U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Revolutionary Ideas, Patents and Progress in America
().
34 The statutory term “non-obvious” appears in the Patent Code in the title to Section . The section itself refers to whether the subject matter sought
to be patented “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
 U.S.C. §. This essay will use, in following the tradition of patent law
commentary, the terms “obviousness” and “nonobviousness.”
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For example, when the question of patent protection for computer software arose, the Congress felt no need to confront the issue. Nor did the courts decide in principle whether patents could
provide protection. It was assumed that in some cases software
patents were possible, and the struggle was over the circumstances.
Specifically, the courts, especially the Supreme Court, invoked a
judge-made mathematical algorithm exception to patentable subject
matter, thereby making it hard to sustain software-related patents.35
But as discussed below, this objection has been largely overcome,36
and, in any event, the courts have never ruled out software-related
patents in principle but have considered only the particular circumstances of each software innovation so long as it fell within the
statutory categories of “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”37
A caveat is, however, in order. Despite this rather clear positive
direction on coverage, the courts took it upon themselves to declare
that certain kinds of inventions were not patentable subject matter.
Although some courts had declared that a “product of nature” could
not be patented because it was not in one of the patentable categories,38 the courts later took to declaring certain things not
patentable without too much attention to the categories.39
To summarize, patent protection for computer software and
biotechnology did not require a go/no go decision by either legislature or courts. The only question was under what circumstances
software and biotech patents met the standards of novelty, usefulness and nonobviousness. However, as we shall see, the courts did
have to wrestle with some judicially created exceptions to patentable
subject matter. In contrast, returning to copyright, we have seen
that a legislative decision was necessary to assure protection for software.
35 See Gottschalk v. Benson,  U.S.  (); Parker v. Flook, 
U.S.  (). But see Diamond v. Diehr,  U.S.  ().
36 See discussion infra at notes - and accompanying text.
37  U.S.C. §. See Diamond v. Diehr,  U.S.  ().
38 Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,  F.d , 
(th Cir. ); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co.,  Fed. , 
(S.D.N.Y. ).
39 See discussion of the mathematical algorithm exception infra at notes
- and accompanying text.
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This difference between the copyright and patent traditions is
illustrated by biotechnology. Since Congress did not undertake to
protect biotechnology by copyright, protection has been sought and
accorded only by patent despite the fact that Congress also took no
action under the patent code. This differential result of
Congressional non-action in both fields is significant not just because there is a secondary literature suggesting copyright protection
for biotechnology40 but because at least some of the field would lend
itself to copyright protection insofar as it has the equivalent of letters, words and sentences. The genetic code in DNA has only four
letters, one for each of the building blocks (nucleotides) that comprised DNA. This is a remarkably efficient alphabet, indeed one in
which all substantive “words” are only three letters long with each
different three-letter “word” coding for an amino acid. With this
language cells are able to express thousands, probably hundreds of
thousands of proteins, and—equally remarkably—to do so with only
twenty naturally occurring amino acids. These amino acids are, if
you like, the “letters” of protein words and sentences. Be that as it
may, patents, not copyrights, are the weapons of choice for biotechnology.
III. S  C
Copyright protection for software, though widely considered
necessary for the incentive effect, clearly risks denying a desirable and
even a necessary degree of access to follow-on innovators. And this
is true even though independent creation is a complete defense to a
charge of copyright infringement. In part this fear of denying access
is based on the quite legitimate need of computer programs to attach
to other programs and to computer hardware. But in part this fear
has also been fed by economists and economics-oriented lawyers
who, with a raft of arguments concerning compatibility, de facto
standards, network externalities, switching costs and lock-in, have
sought to argue that at least some outright copying, not just of soft40 For suggestions in the secondary literature that copyright be used for
biotechnology, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA
Sequences,  Jurimetrics J. , - (); Irving Kayton, Copyright i n
Living Genetically Engineered Works,  George Washington L. Rev. ,
- ().
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ware and hardware interfaces but of baseline programming itself,
should be permitted.41
I have argued elsewhere that despite the extraordinary versatility
of these economic constructs, which incidentally boil down to essentially the same argument, the basic case for copyright protection
of software is quite strong, with only two possible exceptions: first,
where attachment interfaces are involved and second, where the
follow-on innovator substantially improves and adds value to the
software.42 Both of these two possible exceptions involve a special
need for access and the latter is simply a copyright law analogue, via
the “fair use” principle, for what in patent law is called an
“improvement patent.”
The courts have tended in recent years to concentrate on developing theories by which to deny copyright protection to certain
features of particular software programs despite the presence, often
conceded by infringement defendants, of outright wholesale copying. In arriving at these results, the courts in those software cases
have sometimes downplayed the need to balance incentive and access, settling instead on two quite simple legal theories—one, that
the copied programming involved ideas rather than expression43 and
two, that it involved a system or method of operation.44 In short,
those courts have simply applied the statute which denies copyright
protection “to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,”45 a litany that is hardly
self-defining.
Most of those software cases fall in the first category, denying
protection to an idea, which necessarily involves a continuum between unprotected “ideas” and protected “expression.” As Judge
Easterbrook said in Nash v. CBS, a case outside the software field,
the courts must find where on that continuum to draw the line, yet
41 See the analysis of these economic arguments in Kenneth W. Dam,
Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of
Software,  J. Leg. Studies  (hereafter “Protection of Software”).
42 See discussion in Protection of Software.
43 See, e.g., Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, Inc.,  F.d  (d Cir.
).
44 See, e.g., Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 
F.d  (st Cir. ).
45  U.S.C. §(b).
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“[n]either Congress nor the courts has the information” necessary to
draw the line in particular cases.46 What we do know, he said, is
that “it is a mistake to hitch up at either pole of the continuum.”47
So the courts have been drawing the line using a variety of techniques and labels. Perhaps some courts have drawn the line too far
in one direction, undercutting the incentive function of copyright
protection. Perhaps some have undervalued the importance of access. On the whole the courts have done a reasonable job in approaching the balancing task, even though they have not usually
recognized the two economic principles of incentive and access.
Indeed, looking beyond the software cases to the general issue of incentive and access, the courts have long been aware, at least intuitively, of the need to balance these two principles.48
Some commentators argue that software so poorly fits the copyright paradigm that it would have been better to choose a sui generis
approach more conducive to the technical nature of software.49
When one looks at the results of the  Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act, one is left with doubts about a sui generis approach.
There Congress set forth detailed rules but, by failing to consider
amendments over time, Congress has failed to keep progress with
rapidly changing technology and thereby has left the statute essentially irrelevant to present-day semiconductor technology. As the
 Patent Advisory Commission found, “[S]ome of the basic definitions [of the Act] are already obsolete, leaving important parts of
mask work technology outside the protection of that legislation.”50
Nash v. CBS, Inc.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ).
 F.d at .
See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 
(); Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 
Calif. L. Rev.  (). And see Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of
Copyright - ().
49 See the Columbia Manifesto, cited supra note , and citations to earlier
articles along the same line therein.
50 Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the
Secretary of Commerce  (August ). Moreover, according to Rauch, the
rapid change in process technologies creates opportunity for piratical exploitation of the reverse engineering exception to the relatively narrow protection accorded by the statute. John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The
46
47
48
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One can conclude that the general intellectual property law has a
flexibility that sui generis statutes are unlikely to have where fastmoving technology is involved. This conclusion may be somewhat
counter-intuitive, for one might suppose that a specialized statute
should usually be better at dealing with a specialized field of endeavor, but that conclusion about the superiority of Congress over
the courts is not obvious where rapidly advancing technology is concerned.51
IV. S  P
As we have seen, software has also benefited from patent protection. But there too the courts have, on a case by case basis, tried to
balance the incentive and access principles. They have done so,
however, with less clarity of view than in the software copyright
cases. In software patent cases the main field of battle has been a legal principle not to be found in the statute, namely the principle
that mathematical algorithms are not patentable subject matter.
Several decades of time and vats of judicial ink have been spilled
in deciding whether particular software-related inventions constitute
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have wrestled with the issue without bringing much clarity.52 The issues have been how much physical interaction between
software and hardware must be present and whether the software
produces a physical change. To be sure, part of the problem has been
that the Patent and Trademark Office until recently has fought a
rearguard action against enlarging the sphere of software patent
protection,
leading
to
repeated
appeals
by
patent
applicants—frequently successful but not always with well-reasoned
resulting opinions.53 The practical effect of these decisions has been
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of  and the Evolution of the
Semiconductor Industry,  J. Pat. & Trademark Office Soc’y  ().
51 See Protection of Software at -. Several minor amendments have
been made to the Chip Protection Act concerning procedural, rather than substantive, matters.
52 See generally Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and Policy -
()
53 See, however, the PTO’s proposed guidelines for reviewing “computerimplemented inventions.”  Fed. Reg.  (), reprinted in  BNA
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to cause many patent lawyers to draft software claims as so-called
apparatus or machine claims. The applications say, in effect, that the
invention is a machine, not software and certainly not a
mathematical algorithm, and the software is simply a means by
which the machine does its work.
In a recent case, In re Allapat,54 the Federal Circuit—which has
become de facto the Supreme Court of patent law—took a long step
toward drastically restricting the mathematical algorithm exception
by allowing, in an en banc decision, a patent on a software program
whose instructions were executed by well-known computer components. Indeed, the Allapat court emphasized that when a general
purpose computer is programmed, it becomes a special purpose computer and hence, if the claimed invention is new, useful and nonobvious, a patent is appropriate even if a mathematical algorithm is
central to the software itself.55
Suggestive of what is actually at stake is Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in which she argues that “mathematics is not a
monster to be struck down or out of the patent system, but simply
another resource whereby technological advance is achieved.”56 She
went on to observe that modern technology such as software and
electronics inevitably relies heavily on mathematics, that mathematics is “simply another resource whereby technological advance is
achieved,” that there has been “no major technological advance, no
new industry or evolving technology, that has not participated in the
patent system” and therefore the fact that a new technology relies
Patent, Trademark & Copyright J.  (), and the supporting legal
analysis, reprinted id. at . The proposed guidelines, while directed to patent
examiners, not only promise a more receptive attitude toward software patents
but also provide a blueprint for patent claim drafting.
54  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
55 See also In re Lowry,  F.d (), applying analogous reasoning i n
reversing a “printed matter” rejection concerning data structures in computer
memory. On the issue of the relevance of a programmed computer as a statutory “machine” in software cases, see also In re Warmerdam,  F.d  (Fed
Cir. ), and the Federal Circuit’s vacation and remand (July , ) of In
re Trovato,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
56  F.d at , .
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heavily on mathematics should no more disqualify an innovation
than if it relied on the principles of chemistry.57
The Federal Circuit rarely articulates what is really at stake in its
decisions, but it seems apparent that the mathematical algorithm
principle is an attempt to prevent a patent applicant from preempting an abstract principle of human knowledge. To allow such an
abstract principle to be preempted would completely imbalance the
trade-off between incentive and access and would gravely impede
future innovation.
Under this analysis software-related patents can be seen to raise
few access problems with regard to abstract mathematical principles
because a patent on the application of particular software to a computer or to some specialized machine in no ways precludes others
from applying the same mathematical principles to achieve some
other result in a computer or specialized machine. It is the application of the mathematics for a narrow practical use, not the mathematics itself, from which the patentee can exclude the competitor.
Obviously the application of this concept of a balance between
the two economic principles of incentive and access is not self-executing. All of the tools of legal process, including fact-finding and
reasoning, are still required. But explicit attention to this balance
would make patent law decisions more understandable and predictable.
V. B  P
Biotechnology is another new technology that has faced problems in achieving equal protection in the patent system. Nearly every
principle of patent law has to be rethought and interpreted anew in
biotechnology, which is a reason why so many leading patent law
decisions of the last decade have been biotech cases.58 For this reason and in order to explore more deeply the application of the incentive and access principles to contemporary patent law, it is worth
reviewing not merely patentable subject matter but also how the
 F.d at , -.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  U.S.  () (patentable subject
matter); In re Bell,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. )(obviousness); In re Vaeck, 
F.d  (Fed.Cir. ) (enablement); Fiers v. Revel,  F.d  (Fed Cir.
)(conception).
57
58
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courts have handled other core patent issues, such as novelty,
nonobviousness and utility in the biotechnology field.
With respect to the threshold issue of patentable subject matter,
the underlying question is, as in the case of software, one of balancing the two grand economic principles of intellectual property—incentive and access. Under this economic approach, we should take
care to assure that principles of the biological sciences not be preempted through patents but rather only specific technological applications, so that the basic scientific principles remain open to future
innovators. Still the question whether biotech innovations are
patentable subject matter has had to be fought out in the courts.
What has particularly bedeviled the courts and many opponents
of biotechnological research has been the frightening notion that
life itself might be patented. As usually argued, this is predominantly
a religious or ethical concern, but it obviously relates to the question
of what is being preempted if patents are granted.
In the United States the threshold issue was left to the courts
and, as in the case of software, the issue was phrased as whether
patentable subject matter was presented by the patent application.
The breakthrough in the United States was the Supreme Court
decision in the  Chakrabarty case involving a patent on a living
bacterium that could break crude oil down into its chemical components, a highly useful property in fighting crude oil spills.59 The
Court simply concluded that the bacterium was “not nature’s
handiwork,” but the inventor’s, and that Congress had got it right
in the  patent codification when it said that patentable subject
matter “include[d] everything under the sun that is made by man.”60
Converting this approach to my language, one can summarize by
saying that since neither naturally occurring bacteria nor the principles of life but rather just a newly created bacterium was the subject
matter from which the patentee could exclude others, the incentive
principle clearly dominated any concerns about the access principle.
It is thanks to this decision that we now have patents on such
things as the famous Harvard mouse, an oncomouse that rather per59 Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  U.S.  (). See also In re Allen, 
USPQ2d  (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. ), aff’d,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
60  U.S. at -.
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versely had the highly useful property that it was particularly susceptible to carcinogens and therefore lent itself to cancer research.61
The problem in that patent has nothing to do with mice for one
can invent any other kind of non-oncomouse one pleases and so access is not compromised. Rather an access problem lurks in its
broadest claims, including the claim to all transgenic non-human
mammals with increased susceptibilities to cancer. Not just mice but
elephants and whales are excluded too, so long as they show the
same susceptibility to carcinogens.62 Of course, one can still invent a
new elephant if it is made especially susceptible to say malaria rather
than cancer.
More important than transgenic creatures has been the fact that
biotechnology inventions now enjoy patent protection without unnecessary squabbles about threshold life-related subject matter issues.
The situation has been fundamentally different in some foreign
countries that impose major restrictions on biotechnology patents,
just as indeed some still do on pharmaceuticals,63 though the
TRIPS agreement in the Uruguay Round should help because it is a
violation of that agreement to exclude any “field of technology” from
patent protection.64
One general point is that although Congress had previously enacted two sui generis plant patent statutes to protect innovations in
61 P. Leder and T. Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Pat.
,, ().
62 The European Patent Office rejected the broader claims. See Robert P.
Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
 Colum. L. Rev. ,  ().
63 Harold C. Wegener, Patent Harmonization §§- (); Gerald
J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for
Improved Patent Protection Worldwide,  J. of Law & Tech.  ();
Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and Int’l Intellectual Property Protection in an Age
of Advancing Technology,  Am. U. J. Int’l Law and Policy ,  ().
64 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Art. (). However, Article () has
certain exceptions with regard to biotechnology. See also the transitional provisions of Article . See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement,  Int’l Lawyer , -, - ().
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plants,65 in part to avoid lurking doubts about the “product of nature” exception to conventional patent coverage,66 the courts have
wisely found a sui generis approach unnecessary for biotechnology.
Indeed, new man-made plants, whether or not created by biotech
methods, have been held eligible for conventional patents—that is,
eligible for what are called utility patents in order to distinguish
them from plant and design patents.67
VI. B P 
In addition to the patentable subject matter issue, biotech product patent applications must face the three hurdles faced by all
patents; the product must be novel, nonobvious and useful.68 For
commercial efforts in biotechnology, which at least initially were
mostly concerned with using biotech methods to make what already
existed in nature (say a human protein), one can readily see that
these hurdles are not automatically cleared. The key in that context
to meeting these three requirements lies in the fact that biotech
provides the product in a form that is purer and easier to administer
in the treatment of disease, while at the same time being cheaper to
produce than through conventional pharmaceutical processes. As
Sandra Panem has concisely summarized the early promise of
65 The two statutes are the Plant Patent Act of ,  U.S.C. §, and
the Plant Variety Protection Act of ,  U.S.C. §.
66 This was a major motivation of the  Act. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
 U.S. , - (). The  Act extended coverage to sexually reproduced plants.  U.S. at -.
67 Ex parte Hibberd,  USPQ  (Bd. of Pat. App. ). See Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,  F.d ,  (Fed Cir. ).
68 A further hurdle is the enablement requirement.  U.S.C. §. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,  USPQd  (D. Mass. ),
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ). This requirement has the effect of narrowing the
scope of biotech patents by limiting the ability of the applicant to make generic
product claims covering more than the applicant has actually made, In re
Vaeck,  F.d  (Fed.Cir. ), and thereby balances the incentive and access principle by granting the first innovator a narrow patent while leaving
room for follow-on innovators to make claims for other species within the
genus, assuming that the obviousness hurdle can be overcome. For a discussion
of the significance of the enablement requirement to the biotech industry, see
Kenneth J. Burchfield, Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit - ().
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biotechnology, “The power of this new technology lies in the ability
to produce rare biological products in large quantity, with high purity, and at low cost.”69
. Novelty. The courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, have approached the biotech cases in the traditional patent law manner,
which is to treat patent law as unitary and then to apply that law to
the facts as if there were nothing extraordinary about the new technology. The novelty question, which is simply whether the naturally-occurring product is new, had already been answered in the
pharmaceutical cases. Those cases held that if a protein is isolated
and purified, then it is new for the purpose of the novelty test.70
This result not only solves a riddle inherent in the nature of
biotechnology but does so in a way that promotes the incentive
principle.71
. Nonobviousness. The novelty cases do not answer the obviousness question, the second hurdle to patentability. How, one might
ask, can the isolated, purified form of a protein fail to be obvious if it
is otherwise identical to a naturally occurring protein, which we already know about? This is a complicated question that the courts
have struggled with.72 But the courts have not tried to construct a
separate biotechnology patent doctrine. Rather they have used the
traditional approach of comparing what is claimed with the prior
art. The crucial point is that the prior art is not what is known to
nature but what is known to man. For example, if what is known to
man is a protein and what is claimed is a gene and the gene has been
isolated and purified so that it clears the novelty hurdle, then the
obviousness question is not whether it is obvious that a particular
69
70

Sandra Panem, The Interferon Crusade, back cover ().
Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical,  F.d  (th Cir. ); In re
Bergstrom,  F.d  (CCPA ).
71 To the extent that biotech innovation has expanded to include substances, not found in nature, the novelty requirement no longer presents a
special barrier to patentability. See Burchfield, supra note  at .
72 The pharmaceutical cases used a variant of the purification rationale to
deal with the obviousness doctrine as well. See Merck v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical,  F.d ,  (th Cir. ) (“It did not exist in nature in the
form in which the patentees produced it and it was produced by them only after
lengthy experiments. Nothing in the prior art . . . suggested it.” (emphasis supplied)).
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gene having a particular nucleotide sequence exists in principle, but
whether it would be obvious to one skilled in the art how to identify
and isolate it.
The leading case of In re Bell held that while “[i]t may be true
that knowing the structure of the protein, one can use the genetic
code to hypothesize possible structures for the corresponding gene
and that one thus has the potential for obtaining that gene,” nevertheless the degeneracy of the genetic code is such that there are
more than  different possible nucleotide sequences in a gene that
might code for that protein.73 This recognition of the special nature
of the genetic code does not involve, however, any separate doctrine
favoring biotechnology patents but rather constitutes an application
of the long-established principle applied across a wide range of technologies that simply because a new research approach is “obvious to
try” does not mean that a resulting product would be obvious. Thus,
unless there is something in the prior art that would suggest to a researcher a particular gene in question, as opposed to the thousands or
millions of other possible nucleotide sequences that might possibly
encode the particular protein, the resulting isolated and purified
DNA molecules are not obvious and may be patented. While the
processes for looking for the right nucleotide sequence might be
known, it is not obvious how to pick the right one out of this
human haystack.
This approach seems eminently good common sense in the
protein-to-gene case, but it does not provide a rule for the proteinto-protein situation where biotech methods are used to produce a
protein identical to a protein found in nature. Yes, the patent application may meet the novelty test if the protein is isolated and purified, but does it meet the obviousness test? One possible, but inadequate answer is that if the biotech process used to obtain the biotech
form of the protein is new and nonobvious, then of course the
patentability standard is met.74 But the problem is that the inventor
73

 F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ). See also In re Deuel,  F.d 

().
74

Process (or “method”) patents are of course also subject to the nonobviousness requirement. See In re O’Farrell,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
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can obtain a process patent, not a product patent,75 and as the courts
have recognized in the pharmaceutical cases, process patents may be
so hard to enforce that they do not provide a sufficient property
rights basis to finance the risky development and clinical trials necessary to bring a new drug to market.76
The effort to emphasize the incentive function through the isolation-and-purification rationale has created a problem of deterring
future innovation. In the Scripps case a patent involving a blood
growth factor produced by a chemical purification process was held
potentially infringed by the biotech version of the same product.77
75 The  process patent amendments provide product protection in the
sense that  U.S.C. § makes “sale or use” in the United States of a product
made by a patent process an independent act of infringement. However, the use
of the patent process must still be established. Although the amendment was
aimed at imported goods, it was not so limited. See the legislative history cited
in Burchfield, supra note  at  n. .
76 See statement of Judge Rich, dissenting in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.
v. Faytex Corp.,  F.d , - (), that the cost in  of moving
a new chemical entity from laboratory to market was over $ million and that
only one of , to , compounds discovered ever make it to market.
Some attempts to find a solution to this problem have involved so-called product-by-process claims. Such claims have sometimes sought to give product
protection where the essence of the invention is in truth a nonobvious process.
However, the justification for such claims, which are not mentioned in the
patent code, is to permit a patent on “an otherwise patentable product that resists definition by other than the process by which it is made.” In re Thorpe,
 F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ). Compare Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v .
Faytex Corp.,  F.d  (Fed Cir. ), holding that the process is a limitation on a product-by-process claim so that making the product by a different
process would not constitute infringement with Scripps Clinic & Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,  F.d  (Fed. Cir. ), and the dissents
of Judges Rich and Newman in the Atlantic Thermoplastics case, supra.
77 Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,  F.
Supp.  (N.D. Cal. ), but see a later decision in same case holding many
claims invalid,  F. Supp.  (N.D. Cal. ), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ). See discussion in Robert Patrick Merges, Patent
Law and Policy - (), and Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,  Colum. L. Rev. , -
(). The Federal Circuit pointed a way out of the dilemma thus created by
the Scripps lower court holding by remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a seldom applied doctrine,
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The full impact of that decision on innovation over time becomes
clearer when one considers that its doctrine could presumably preclude a subsequent biotech firm from producing the same growth
factor through still newer and even more superior biotech processes.78
As biotechnology has progressed, the obviousness question tends
not to arise in the simplistic way just discussed in which the applicant claims the biotech equivalent of the naturally occurring substance—for example, a protein or a gene—but rather claims some
new biotechnological half-way house. To the extent that biotechnology today creates substances that do not exist in nature, the obviousness issue rather becomes the generic issue of what would have
been obvious to one skilled in the art.79
. Utility. The third hurdle to patentability, namely the utility
doctrine, has become in some ways the front line in the biotech
patent wars. The Constitution’s reference to the “useful Arts” has
led to the statutory requirement of utility. Put abstractly, the
threshold utility issue is whether any utility has been shown if a
substance simply does what the corresponding natural substance
does. The essence of the issue is, however, that some major advances
may not yet have a concrete use in medicine or agriculture or any
other end use economic activity.
These R&D outputs, often the product of enormous R&D
outlays, are more than basic research results but may not, without
further R&D, result in something of immediate concrete value to
mankind. Still, they may be sold in the marketplace, particularly to
pharmaceutical firms. While an economist might say that whatever
commands a price in the marketplace meets an economic utility test,
avoided the dilemma by absolving the biotech firm from infringement liability.
 F.d  (Fed. Cir. ).
78 See, however, Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation,  F.d 
(Fed. Cir. ), a doctrine of equivalents case, implicitly distinguishing the
situation where an allegedly infringing protein was superior in therapeutic
application to the patented protein.
79 See, e.g., In re Vaeck,  F.d  (Fed Cir. ). A recent statute
extends biotech patent protection for processes by prohibiting obviousness
rejections for biotech processes “using or resulting in a composition of matter”
that is novel and nonobvious. P.L. - ().
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a conventional legal view has been that something that is useful only
in further research does not meet the statutory utility requirement.
For the purposes of emphasizing the factors at play it suffices to
take just one hotly contested, indeed highly emotional, question
now being fought out in the patent system. Suppose I use biotech
methods to isolate not previously known partial complementary
DNA sequences.80 Yes, partial cDNA sequences may be patentable
subject matter, but is the utility requirement met if we do not know
for sure what they are useful for? Put in the language of the current
debate, should we not wait until we at least know the function of
these sequences? Or, to use the jargon of patent law, do the sequences have practical utility?81 In short, do they provide “some
immediate benefit to the public”?82
One answer is to say that we should just wait until we have
something truly useful—of “immediate benefit to the public”—before granting a patent.83 Under this view we should wait, for example, until we have isolated a useful protein using that cDNA
sequence before considering patentability or until we have at least
identified and located the cellular DNA or perhaps synthetically
generated the full DNA sequences required to produce a protein.
The essence of the policy argument for this wait-and-see approach
is that issuing such cDNA patents would inhibit research leading to
truly useful discoveries.84
The problem with this wait-and-see solution is twofold: First,
given the progress in biotech methods, the method of identifying
80

A complementary DNA sequence is one derived from messenger
RNA, which may be thought of as a half-way house between cellular DNA and
the protein expressed by that DNA within the cell. For an explanation, see In
re Deuel,  F.d ,  ().
81 On the patent law concept of utility, see Brenner v. Manson,  U.S.
 ().
82 Nelson v. Bowler,  F.d ,  (CCPA ).
83 One can find an analogy in In re Joly,  F.d  (CCPA ),
which held that one cannot patent a chemical compound that is useful only because it is an intermediate in making another chemical compound in the absence of showing the utility of the latter compound.
84 Bernice Wuetherich, All Rights Reserved: How the Gene-Patenting
Race is Affecting Science,  Science News  (Sept. , ), offers an example.
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and locating the entire gene may be obvious from knowledge of the
partial cDNA sequence. Second, the protein may be obvious from
the gene or even from a complete cDNA sequence.85 And so if
there is no patent on the partial sequence, there may be no patent
available at a later stage because of the nonobviousness requirement.
Would such an outcome serve the incentive function of the
patent system? As already mentioned, it is well-known that pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to engage in R&D and unwilling to go through the expensive Federal Drug Administration clinical trial process on new drugs unless patent protection can be relatively assured because otherwise commercialization will not be financially feasible.86 Of course, if the firm that discovers the partial
sequence neither publishes it nor sells it publicly, then it may later be
able to patent the full gene. The result would, however, be later disclosure to the public and to that extent, perversely, serve neither the
incentive nor the access function.87
No doubt recognizing this simple fact of business life, the
Commissioner of Patents, reacting to criticism from the biotech industry, adopted guidelines in  making clear that a patent examiner should not reject biotech applications where the asserted utility
85

“Like mRNA [messenger RNA], cDNA contains only the protein-encoding regions of DNA. Thus, once a cDNA’s nucleotide sequence is known,
the amino acid sequence of the protein for which it codes may be predicted using the genetic code relationship between codons and amino acids.” In re
Deuel,  F.d ,  (Fed. Cir. ).
86 Bernadine Healey, Special Report on Gene Patenting,  New
England J. of Medicine ,  (); Reid G. Adler, Genome Research:
Fulfilling the Public’s Expectations for Knowledge and Commercialization, 
Science  (); Gerald G. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical
Companies: The Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide,  J. of Law
& Tech.  ().
87 A recent development has been the effort of Merck to underwrite
University laboratory sequencing of human cDNA followed by immediate deposit of the sequences in a public databank. This approach results in prompt
disclosure to the public but also undercuts efforts by other to patent such sequences. See Columbia Shuns Profits from Gene Fragments,  Science 
(April , ). Since Merck is primarily a pharmaceutical rather than a
biotech firm, the question of its motivation has arisen. Eliot Marshall, HGS
Opens its Databanks—for a Price,  Science  (Oct. , ); and Jerry B.
Bishop, Plan May Blow Lid Off Secret Gene Research, Wall St. J. B (Sept.
, ).
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“would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill.”88
Perhaps these guidelines will lead to patents being granted on
cDNA sequences for their utility in construction of DNA probes or
in new forensic applications or in tissue typing or in diagnostic applications.89 Looking further ahead, cDNA sequences could be
useful in some as yet unexploited ways based on the essential comparability of DNA in all of earth’s creatures. Some of these utility
theories, especially use in constructing cDNA probes to identify and
locate the gene, have to confront the important principle of utility
doctrine that frowns on any theory based on usefulness in further
research.90 This principle, which has its legal justification in the
notion that an innovation useful only in further research is not of
“immediate benefit to the public,”91 is a somewhat dubious notion
when biotech research itself has raised billions of dollars of capital
from the public.
The legal memorandum accompanying the PTO’s new utility
guidelines casts doubt on the legal rationale for any research tool exception:
Many research tools such as gas chromatographs, screening
assays, and nucleotide sequencing techniques have a clear,
specific and unquestionable utility (e.g., they are useful in
analyzing compounds). An assessment that focuses on
whether an invention is useful only in a research setting
thus does not address whether the specific invention is in
fact “useful” in a patent sense.92
88  Fed. Reg. ,  () reprinted in BNA Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Journal  ()
89 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 
Science  (); Eliot Marshall, The Company that Genome Researchers
Love to Hate,  Science  (Dec. , ); John Carey, Untangling the
Legal Strands of DNA, Business Week  (May , ). For a critical review
of these utility theories, see Stephen B. Mabius, Novel DNA Sequences and
the Utility Requirement: the Human Genome Initiative,  J. Pat. and
Trademark Off. Soc.  ().
90 See Burchfield, supra note  at -; and Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Symposium: A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting
Controversy,  U. Pitt. L. Rev. , - ();
91 Nelson v. Bowler,  F.d ,  (CCPA ).
92  BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright J. ,  ().
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If this view is sustained by the courts, the incentive function will
be preserved in the biotech industry. But what about access for future innovation? We must recognize that the fight over partial
cDNA sequences arises from the fear in academia, and also in some
portions of the pharmaceutical industry, that access to the basic biological building blocks of the human body will be preempted by
patents.93 Here again the solution to this burning biotech patent
issue lies in a clear recognition and discussion of the balance between
the incentive and access principles.
The foregoing discussion of the utility issue in biotechnology is
not an attempt to lay down rules for its resolution in the manifold
factual situations presented by the onrushing progress of the field
but rather is simply an illustration of an economic approach to intellectual property law that is by no means limited to threshold issues of
whether or not to protect a new technology. This economic approach throws light on nearly all of the technical issues of patent
and copyright law.
93

On the possibility that the experimental use defense to patent infringement will satisfy the academic concerns, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and
the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental use, 
U.Chi.L.Rev.  ().

Readers with comments should address them to:
Kenneth W. Dam
Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law
The Law School
The University of Chicago
 E. th Street
Chicago, Illinois 

C W P  L  E
(S S)

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries
and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July
).
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort (August ).
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism
(September ).
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February ).
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools (February ).
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation
of aids (April ).
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April
).
William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July ).
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of
Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study (August ).
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law:
A Theoretical Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy
(September ).
Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing
Contracts (November ).
Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life
(January ).
J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan (March ).

. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental
Law (April ).
. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) (April ).
. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital
(August ).
. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts:
The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System (August
).
. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Anticipatory Adjudication (September ).
. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law (September ).
. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis
(October ).
. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle
(March ).
. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the
Law (June ).
. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis
(June ).
. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from
Early Modern Japan (August ).
. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement
Escrows (August ).
. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software (August ).
. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October ).
. David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond
Cimino (December ).
. Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational
Distribution of Lifetime Consumption (January ).

. Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract
Damages (February )
. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller,
Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation
(March ).
. Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the
American Business Enterprise (April ).
. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August ).
. J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November ).
. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software
and Biotechnology (November ).

